Publications
Book Chapters
Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Systems
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ron Kupfer
In Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, Editors: Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay Vazirani
Secretaries, Prophets and Applications to Matching
Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier
In Online and Matching-Based Market Design. Editors: Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V. Vazirani, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming)
Working Papers
On Welfare Approximation and Stable Pricing
Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
[ arxiv ]
2023 + Forthcoming
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Thomas Kesselheim,
Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC'23), 2023.
[ conference | arxiv ]
Who is Next in Line? On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin and Zhihao Gavin Tang,
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA'23), 2023.
[ conference | arxiv ]
Interdependent Public Projects
Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divya Mohan and Inbal Talgam-Cohen,
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA'23), 2023.
[ conference | arxiv ]
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman and Daniel Peretz,
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'23), 2023.
[ conference | arxiv ]
Pandora’s Problem with Combinatorial Cost
Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Federico Fusco,
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'23), 2023.
[ conference | arxiv ]
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints
Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman and Erel Segal-Halevi
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), 76: 567—611, 2023.
[ journal | conference | arxiv ]
Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding
Michal Feldman and Galia Shabtai
Games and Economic Behavior (GEB),140, 316—340, 2023.
[ journal | conference | arxiv ]
2022
Prophet Matching with General Arrivals
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin and Zhihao Gavin Tang,
Mathematics of Operations Research (MOR), 47(2), 847—1705 (2022).
Alon Eden, Uriel Feige and Michal Feldman,
Theory of Computing (ToC), (APPROX-RANDOM'19 Special Issue) 18(6), 1—33 (2022).
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, and Anna Karlin
Mathematics of Operations Research (MOR) (accepted under minor revision), 2022.
[ arxiv ]
Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap
Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Theory of Computing (ToC), (APPROX-RANDOM'16 Special Issue) (accepted under minor revision), 2022.
[ journal | conference | arxiv ]
Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim and Brendan Lucier
SIAM Journal on Computing (SICOMP), 49(3), 540--582.
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions.
Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin and Daniel Schoepflin,
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’22), 2022.
[ conference | arxiv ]
Secretary Matching with General Arrivals.
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin and Zhihao Tang,
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’22), 2022.
[ conference | arxiv ]
Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai and Aner Wolfenfeld,
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'22), 2022
[ conference | arxiv ]
Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents (and Beyond).
Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman and Amos Fiat
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'22), 2022.
[ conference | arxiv ]
2021
Combinatorial Contracts.
Paul Dutting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Thomas Kesselheim
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS’21), 2021.
[ conference | arxiv ]
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
Operations Research 69(1): 188-206 (2021).
[ journal ]
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents
Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige and Michal Feldman
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'21), 2021.
[ conference | arxiv ]
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations
Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige and Michal Feldman
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021 (EC'21)
[ conference | arxiv ]
On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ron Kupfer
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021 (IJCAI'21)
[ conference | arxiv ]
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints
Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman and Erel Segal-Halevi
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021 (AAAI'21)
[ journal | conference | arxiv ]
An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal
SIAM Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms, 2021 (SOSA'21)
[ conference | arxiv ]
Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values
Alon Eden and Michal Feldman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Ori Zviran
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021 (AAAI'21)
[ conference | arxiv ]
Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding
Michal Feldman and Galia Shabtai
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021 (AAAI'21)
[ conference | arxiv ]
2020
Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier
Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2020 (WINE'20)
[ Journal ]
On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets
Ben Berger, Alon Eden and Michal Feldman
Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2020 (WINE'20)
[ conference | arxiv ]
Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin and Zhihao Gavin Tang
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020 (EC'20)
[ conference | arxiv ]
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020 (EC'20)
[ conference | arxiv ]
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ophir Friedler
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020 (EC'20)
[conference | arxiv ]
Pricing Multi-Unit Markets
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 7(4): 20:1-20:29 (2020)
[ journal | conference ]
Approximate Modularity Revisited
Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
SIAM Journal on Computing (SICOMP), forthcoming.
[ journal | conference | arxiv ]
2019
Online Random Sampling and Applications to Budgeted Settings
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi
Theory of Computing Systems, Special Issue on SAGT'17, 63(7): 1470--1498, 2019.
[ conference | journal ]
Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Matt Weinberg
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'19), 2019.
[ arxiv | conference ]
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, and Anna Karlin
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (Best Paper with a Student Lead Author Award)
[ arxiv ]
Stable Secretaries
Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
Algorithmica, 81(8): 3136--3161 (2019).
[ conference | arxiv | journal ]
Max-Min Greedy Matching
Alon Eden, Uriel Feige and Michal Feldman
International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX'19), 2019. Also presented at EC Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2019)
[ arxiv | conference | workshop ]
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ophir Friedler
EC Workshop on Workshop on Behavioral Economics and Computation, 2019.
[ arxiv ]
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren and Moshe Tennenholz
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 7(3): 14:2--14:27, 2019.
[ arxiv | journal | conference ]
Efficient Allocation of Free Stuff
Yossi Azar, Allan Borodin, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kineret Segal
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'19), 2019
[ conference ]
2018
Interdependent Values without Single Crossing
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kira Goldner
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
[ arxiv | conference ]
Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ilan Nehama
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
[ arxiv | conference ]
99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler and Aviad Rubinstein
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
[ conference ]
Pricing Identical Items
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden and Warut Suksompong
Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2018 (WINE'18)
[ arxiv ]
Prompt Scheduling of Selfish Agents
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Tzahi Taub
26th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA'18), 2018
[ arxiv ]
An Economic-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kineret Segal
[ writeup | arxiv ]
2017
Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim and Brendan Lucier
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2017 (FOCS'17)
[ arxiv | conference ]
Approximate Modularity Revisited
Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2017 (STOC'17)
[ conference | arxiv | journal ]
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
[ conference | arxiv ]
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
[ conference | arxiv ]
Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Alan Roytman
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
[ conference | arxiv ]
Stable Secretaries
Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
[ conference | arxiv | journal ]
Pricing Social Goods
Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman
European Symposium on Algorithms, 2017 (ESA'17)
[ conference | arxiv ]
Online Random Sampling and Applications to Budgeted Settings
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17) Best Paper Award.
[ conference | journal ]
Liquid Price of Anarchy
Yossi Azar, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Alan Roytman
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17)
[ conference | arxiv ]
The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics
Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17)
[ arxiv | conference ]
2016
Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium
Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
SIAM Journal on Computing, 45(1): 29--48 (2016)
[ conference | journal | arxiv ]
Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 5(1):8:1-8:26 (2016)
[ conference | arxiv | journal ]
Online Pricing with Strategic and Patient Buyers
Michal Feldman, Tomer Koren, Roi Livni, Yishay Mansour, Aviv Zohar
NIPS 2016: 3864-3872 (NIPS'16)
[ conference ]
Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan
WINE 2016: 131-144 (WINE'16)
[ arxiv | conference ]
Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap
Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems, 2016 (APPROX'16)
[ conference ]
The Price of Anarchy in Large Games
Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis
ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2016 (STOC'16)
[ conference | arxiv ]
Lottery Pricing Equilibria
Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
[ conference ]
Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
[ conference ]
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tenneholtz
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
[ conference | journal | arxiv ]
On Voting and Facility Location
Michal Feldman, Iddan Golumb, Amos Fiat
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
[ conference | arxiv ]
The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing
Vincent Cohen-Addad, Michal Feldman, Alon Eden, Amos Fiat
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
[ conference | arxiv ]
Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient
Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin and Brendan Lucier
Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue on STOC'13, forthcoming
[ conference | arxiv ]
Variations on the Hotelling-Downs Model
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Svetlana Obraztsova
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) 2016: 496-501
[ conference ]
2015
Capacitated Network Design Games
Michal Feldman and Tom Ron
Theory of Computing Systems, 57(3): 576-597 (2015)
[ conference | journal ]
Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
SODA 2015: 123-135
[ conference | arxiv ]
Implementing the Wisdom of Waze
Michal Feldman, Avinatan Hassidim, Shoshana Vasserman
IJCAI 2015
[ conference ]
How Robust is the Wisdom of the Crowds?
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Omer Lev, Moshe Tennenholtz
IJCAI 2015
[ conference ]
A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
ICALP 2015
[ conference ]
Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects
Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir
Inf. Process. Lett. 115(2): 112-118 (2015)
[ conference | journal ]
Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive BundlingEquilibrium
Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein
WINE 2015: 300-313
[ conference | arxiv ]
A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes
Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
AAAI 2015: 872-878
[ conference | arxiv ]
Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri
AAAI 2015: 879-885
[ conference | arxiv | journal ]
2014
Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization
Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2(2): 5 (2014)
[ conference | arxiv | journal ]
Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning inSocial Networks
Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
APPROX-RANDOM 2014: 192-208
[ conference | arxiv ]
Clearing Markets via Bundles
Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier
SAGT 2014: 158-169
[ conference | Preview | arxiv ]
Sequential Decision Making with Vector Outcomes
Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz
Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2014 (ITCS'14)
[ conference ]
@ Design by Miri Oren, Wix