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Publications 

Book Chapters

 

Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Systems
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ron Kupfer
In Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, Editors: Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay Vazirani​

Secretaries, Prophets and Applications to Matching
Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier
In
Online and Matching-Based Market Design. Editors: Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V. Vazirani, Cambridge University Press (2023)

2024 + Forthcoming

Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (𝑝, 𝑞)-Veto Core
Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan;
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’24), 2024.
[ conference |  arxiv ]

The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities
Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo;
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’24), 2024.
[ conference |  arxiv ]

Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan;
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’24), 2024.
[ conference |  arxiv ]

Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka;
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’24), 2024.
[ conference |  arxiv ]

Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang;
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’24), 2024.
[ conference |  arxiv ]

Fair Division via Quantile Shares
Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman and Vishnu Narayan
Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC'24), 2024.

[ conference | arxiv]

On the (in)Aproximability of Combinatorial Contracts  

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Maya Schlesinger;

Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS’24), 2024.

[ conference | arxiv ]

Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman and Yoav Gal-Tzur;
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA'24), 2024.

[ conference arxiv ]
 

On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare

Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras and Tomasz Ponitka;

AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'24), 2024.

[ conference | arxiv ]

Pandora's Problem with Deadlines
Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Federico Fusco;
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI’24), 2024.

[ conference arxiv ]

2023

Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents  

Michal Feldman, Federico FuscoSimon MaurasRebecca Reiffenhäuser;

50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023), 2023.

[ conference | arxiv ]

Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations  

Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner, Simon Mauras and Divya Mohan,

Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'23), 2023.

[ conference | arxiv ]

Multi-Agent Contracts 

Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Thomas Kesselheim,

Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC'23), 2023.

[ conference | arxiv ]

Who is Next in Line? On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings 

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin and Zhihao Gavin Tang,

Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA'23), 2023.

[ conference | arxiv ]

Interdependent Public Projects

Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divya Mohan and Inbal Talgam-Cohen,

Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA'23), 2023.

[ conference arxiv ]

Ambiguous Contracts 

Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman and Daniel Peretz,

ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'23), 2023.

[ conference | arxiv ]

Pandora’s Problem with Combinatorial Cost 

Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Federico Fusco,

ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'23), 2023.

[ conference | arxiv ]

On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints

Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman and Erel Segal-Halevi

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), 76: 567—611, 2023.

[ journalconference | arxiv ]

Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding

Michal Feldman and Galia Shabtai

Games and Economic Behavior (GEB),140, 316—340, 2023.

[ journal conference | arxiv ]

2022

Prophet Matching with General Arrivals

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin and Zhihao Gavin Tang,

 Mathematics of Operations Research (MOR), 47(2), 847—1705 (2022).

[ journal | arxiv ]

Max-Min Greedy Matching

Alon Eden, Uriel Feige and Michal Feldman,

Theory of Computing (ToC), (APPROX-RANDOM'19 Special Issue) 18(6), 1—33 (2022).

[ journal | arxiv ]

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue

Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, and Anna Karlin

Mathematics of Operations Research (MOR) (accepted under minor revision), 2022.

arxiv ]

Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap

Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Theory of Computing (ToC), (APPROX-RANDOM'16 Special Issue) (accepted under minor revision), 2022.

[ journalconference | arxiv ]

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs

Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim and Brendan Lucier

SIAM Journal on Computing (SICOMP), 49(3), 540--582.

[ journal | arxiv ]

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions.

Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin and Daniel Schoepflin,

ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’22), 2022.

[ conference | arxiv ]

Secretary Matching with General Arrivals.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin and Zhihao Tang,

ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’22), 2022.

[ conference | arxiv ]

Two-Price Equilibrium.

Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai and Aner Wolfenfeld,

AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'22), 2022

[ conferencearxiv ]

Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents (and Beyond).

Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman and Amos Fiat

AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'22), 2022.

[ conferencearxiv ]

2021 

Combinatorial Contracts.

Paul Dutting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Thomas Kesselheim

Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS’21), 2021.

[ conferencearxiv ]

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.

Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg

Operations Research 69(1): 188-206 (2021).

[ journal ]

Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents

Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige and Michal Feldman

International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'21), 2021.

[ conferencearxiv ]

Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations

Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige and Michal Feldman

ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021 (EC'21)

[ conference | arxiv ]

On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ron Kupfer

International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021 (IJCAI'21)

[ conference | arxiv ]

On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints

Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman and Erel Segal-Halevi

AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021 (AAAI'21)

[ journalconference | arxiv ]

An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal
SIAM Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms, 2021 (SOSA'21)
[ conference | arxiv ]

Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values
Alon Eden and Michal Feldman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Ori Zviran
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021 (AAAI'21)
[ conference | arxiv ]

Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding
Michal Feldman and Galia Shabtai
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021 (AAAI'21)
conference | arxiv ]

2020

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs

Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier

Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2020 (WINE'20)

[ Journal ]

On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets
Ben Berger, Alon Eden and Michal Feldman
Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2020 (WINE'20)
[ conference | arxiv ]

Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin and Zhihao Gavin Tang
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020 (EC'20)
conference | arxiv ]

Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020 (EC'20)
[ conferencearxiv ]

A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ophir Friedler
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020 (EC'20)
[conference | 
arxiv ]

Pricing Multi-Unit Markets
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 7(4): 20:1-20:29 (2020)
[ journal | conference ]

Approximate Modularity Revisited
Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
SIAM Journal on Computing (SICOMP), forthcoming.
[ journal | conference | arxiv ]

2019

Online Random Sampling and Applications to Budgeted Settings
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi
Theory of Computing Systems, Special Issue on SAGT'17, 63(7): 1470--1498, 2019.
[ conference | journal ]

Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Matt Weinberg
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'19), 2019.
[ arxiv | conference ]

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, and Anna Karlin
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (Best Paper with a Student Lead Author Award)
[ arxiv ]

Stable Secretaries
Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
Algorithmica, 81(8): 3136--3161 (2019).
[ conference | arxiv | journal ]

Max-Min Greedy Matching
Alon Eden, Uriel Feige and Michal Feldman
International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX'19), 2019. Also presented at EC Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2019)
[ arxiv | conference | workshop ]

A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ophir Friedler
EC Workshop on Workshop on Behavioral Economics and Computation, 2019.
[ arxiv ]

Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren and Moshe Tennenholz
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 7(3): 14:2--14:27, 2019.
[ arxiv | journal | conference ]

Efficient Allocation of Free Stuff
Yossi Azar, Allan Borodin, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kineret Segal
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'19), 2019
[ conference ]

2018

Interdependent Values without Single Crossing
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kira Goldner
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
[ arxiv | conference ]

Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ilan Nehama
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
[ arxiv | conference ]

99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler and Aviad Rubinstein
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
[ conference ]

Pricing Identical Items
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden and Warut Suksompong
Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2018 (WINE'18)
[ arxiv ]

Prompt Scheduling of Selfish Agents
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Tzahi Taub
26th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA'18), 2018
[ arxiv ]

An Economic-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kineret Segal
[ writeup | arxiv ]

2017

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim and Brendan Lucier
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2017 (FOCS'17)
[ arxiv | conference ]

Approximate Modularity Revisited
Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2017 (STOC'17)
[ conference | arxiv | journal ]

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
[ conference | arxiv ]

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
[ conference | arxiv ]

Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Alan Roytman
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
[ conference | arxiv ]

Stable Secretaries
Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
[ conference | arxiv | journal ]

Pricing Social Goods
Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman
European Symposium on Algorithms, 2017 (ESA'17)
[ conference | arxiv ]

Online Random Sampling and Applications to Budgeted Settings
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17) Best Paper Award.
[ conference | journal ]

Liquid Price of Anarchy
Yossi Azar, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Alan Roytman
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17)
[ conference | arxiv ]

The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics
Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17)
[ arxiv | conference ]

2016

Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium
Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
SIAM Journal on Computing, 45(1): 29--48 (2016)
[ conference | journal | arxiv ]

Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 5(1):8:1-8:26 (2016)
[ confere
nce | arxiv | journal ]

Online Pricing with Strategic and Patient Buyers
Michal Feldman, Tomer Koren, Roi Livni, Yishay Mansour, Aviv Zohar
NIPS 2016: 3864-3872 (NIPS'16)
[ conference ]

Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan
WINE 2016: 131-144 (WINE'16)
[ arxiv | conference ]

Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap
Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems, 2016 (APPROX'16)
[ conference ]

The Price of Anarchy in Large Games
Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis
ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2016 (STOC'16)
[ conference | arxiv ]

Lottery Pricing Equilibria
Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)

[ conference ]

Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
[ conference ]

Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tenneholtz
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
[ conference | journal | arxiv ]

On Voting and Facility Location
Michal Feldman, Iddan Golumb, Amos Fiat
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
[ conference | arxiv ]

The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing
Vincent Cohen-Addad, Michal Feldman, Alon Eden, Amos Fiat
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
[ conference | arxiv ]

Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient
Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin and Brendan Lucier
Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue on STOC'13, forthcoming
[ conference | arxiv ]

Variations on the Hotelling-Downs Model
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Svetlana Obraztsova
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) 2016: 496-501
[ conference ]

2015

Capacitated Network Design Games
Michal Feldman and Tom Ron
Theory of Computing Systems, 57(3): 576-597 (2015)
[ conference | journal ]

Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
SODA 2015: 123-135
[ conference | arxiv ]

Implementing the Wisdom of Waze
Michal Feldman, Avinatan Hassidim, Shoshana Vasserman
IJCAI 2015
[ conference ]

How Robust is the Wisdom of the Crowds?
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Omer Lev, Moshe Tennenholtz
IJCAI 2015
[ conference ]

A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
ICALP 2015
[ conference ]

Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects
Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir
Inf. Process. Lett. 115(2): 112-118 (2015)
[ conference | journal ]

Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive BundlingEquilibrium
Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein
WINE 2015: 300-313
[ conference | arxiv ]

A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes
Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
AAAI 2015: 872-878
[ conference | arxiv ]

Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri
AAAI 2015: 879-885
[ conference | arxiv | journal ]

2014

Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization
Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2(2): 5 (2014)
[ conference | arxiv | journal ]

Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning inSocial Networks
Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
APPROX-RANDOM 2014: 192-208
[ conference | arxiv ]

Clearing Markets via Bundles
Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier
SAGT 2014: 158-169
[ conference | Preview | arxiv ]

Sequential Decision Making with Vector Outcomes
Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz
Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2014 (ITCS'14)

[ conference ]

2013

The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu and Moshe Tennenholtz
Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2013 (WINE'13)
[ conference ]

Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions
Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier and Vasilis Syrgkanis
Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2013 (WINE'13)
[ conference | Preview | arxiv ]

Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale
Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier and Renato Paes Leme
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013 (EC'13): 873--890
[ conference | arxiv ]

Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective
Michal Feldman and Yoav Wilf
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013 (EC'13)
[ conference ]

Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium
Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin and Brendan Lucier
ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2013 (STOC'13)
[ conference | arxiv | journal ]

Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient
Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin and Brendan Lucier
ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2013 (STOC'13)
[ conference | arxiv ]

Efficient Parking Allocation as Online Bipartite Matchingwith Posted Prices
Reshef Meir, Yiling Chen and Michal Feldman
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2013 (AAMAS'13)
[ conference ]

Approximate Strong Equilibria in Job Scheduling Games with Two Uniformly Related Machines
Leah Epstein, Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir, Lukasz Witkowski and Marcin Witkowski
Discrete Applied Mathematics 161(13-14): 1843-1858 (2013)
[ journal ]

Adversarial Leakage in Games
Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics (SIDMA) -27(1): 363-385 (2013)
[ journal | conference ]

Implementation with a Bounded Action Space
Liad Blumrosen and Michal Feldman
Accepted (under minor revision) to Games and Economic Behavior (GEB)
[ conference ]

2012

Convergence of Best-Response Dynamics in Games with Conflicting Congestion Effects
Michal Feldman and Tami Tamir
Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, 2012 (WINE'12)
[ journal ]

Mechanisms and impossibilities for truthful, envy-free allocations
Michal Feldman and John Lai
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2012 (SAGT'12)
[ conference ]

Capacitated Network Design Games
Michal Feldman and Tom Ron
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2012 (SAGT'12)
[ conference | journal ]

Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization
Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme and Moshe Tennenholtz
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012 (EC'12)
[ conference | arxiv | journal ]

Mechanism Design on Discrete Lines and Cycles
Elad Dokow, Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir and Ilan Nehama
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012 (EC'12)
[ conference ]

Revenue-Maximizing Envy-Free Multi-Unit Auctions with Budgets
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi and Piotr Sakowski
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012 (EC'12)
[ conference ]

On Maxsum Fair Cake Divisions
Steven Brams, Michal Feldman, John Lai, Jamie Morgenstern and Ariel Procaccia
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012 (AAAI'12)
[ conference ]

Stability Scores: Measuring Coalitional Stability
Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2012 (AAMAS'12)
[ conference ]

Mastering Multi-Player Games
Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2012 (AAMAS'12)
[ conference ]

Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games
Michal Feldman and Tami Tamir
Operations Research (OR), 60(3): 529--540, 2012.
[ journal | conference ]

Combinatorial Agency
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan and Eyal Winter
Journal of Economic Theory (JET), 147(3): 999-1034.
[ journal ]

On the Approximability of Dodgson and Young Elections
Ioannis Caragiannis, Jason Covey, Michal Feldman, Christopher Homan, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Karanikolas, Ariel Procaccia and Jeffrey Rosenschein
Artificial Intelligence journal (AIJ), 187-188:31-51.
[ journal | conference ]

2011

Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions
Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz
In Workshop on Internet Economics, 2011
[ conference ]

Truth, Envy, and Truthful Market Clearing Bundle Pricing
Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, and Svetlana Olonetzky
Workshop on Internet Economics, 2011; an earlier version (titled: Truth and Envy in Capacitated Allocation Games Authors) presented in the International Workshop on Game Theory, 2011
[ conference ]

Solving Cooperative Reliability Games
Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz
In Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 2011 (UAI'11)
[ conference | arxiv ]

Dynamic Inefficiency: Anarchy without Stability
Noam Berger, Michal Feldman, Ofer Neiman and Mishael Rosenthal
In the Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2011 (SAGT'11)
[ conference ]

Revenue Maximization in Probabilistic Single-Item Auctions by means of Signaling
Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu and Moshe Tennenholtz
In Electronic Commerce Workshop on Ad Auctions, 2011

2006 - 2010

Economical Graph Discovery
Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz
In Innovations in Computer Science, 2010 (ICS'10)
[ conference ]

Walking in Circles
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel Procaccia and Moshe Tennenholtz
Discrete Mathematics (DM) 310(23):3432-3435.
[ journal ]

Structured Coalitions in Resource Selection Games
Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (ACM-TIST), special issue on AI in Social Computing and Cultural Modeling - forthcoming.
[ journal ]

Strategyproof Approximation of the minimax on Networks
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel Procaccia and Moshe Tennenholtz
Mathematics of Operations Research (MOR) 35(3):513-526, 2010.
[ journal ]

Bayesian Ignorance
Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz
In Theoretical Computer Science, 2012, pp. 1-11, and in Proceedings of Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC'10), 384-391.
[ conference | journal ]

Envy-Free Mechanisms for Makespan Approximation
Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan and Svetlana Olonetzky.
In SIAM Journal on Computing (SICOMP) 41, pp. 12--25, and In Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'10).
[ conference | journal | arxiv ]

A Note on Competitive Diffusion Through Social Networks
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel Procaccia and Moshe Tennenholtz.
In Information Processing Letters (IPL) 110:221-225, 2010.
[ conference | journal ]

Playing Games Without Observing Payoffs
Michal Feldman, Adam Kalai and Moshe Tennenholtz
In Innovations in Computer Science, pages 106-110, 2010 (ICS'10).
[ conference ]

Adversarial Leakage in Games
Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz
In Innovations in Computer Science, 2010 (ICS'10).
[ conference | journal ]

A Prescriptive Approach for Playing Games
Michal Feldman
In SIGecom Exchanges, Issue 8.2, 2009.
[ journal ]

Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies
Yuval Emek and Michal Feldman
In Theoretical Computer Science, 2012, pp 56-74, and in the Workshop on Internet Economics, 2009 (WINE'09).
[ conference ]

Optimal Incentives for Participation with Type-Dependent Externalities
Michal Feldman, Ran Tessler and Yoav Wilf
In the Workshop on Internet Economics, 2009 (WINE'09).

Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman and Noam Nisan
In the Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2009 (SAGT'09).
[ conference ]

Partition Equilibrium
Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz
In the Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2009 (SAGT'09).
[ conference ]

On the Approximability of Dodgson and Young Elections
Ioannis Caragiannis, Jason Covey, Michal Feldman, Christopher Homan, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Karanikolas, Ariel Procaccia and Jeffrey Rosenschein
In ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2009 (SODA'09).
[ conference | journal ]

Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games
Michal Feldman and Tami Tamir
In the Workshop on Internet and Network Economics 2008 (WINE'08).
[ conference | journal ]

Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games
Michal Feldman and Tami Tamir
In Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR) 36:387-414, 2009, and In Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'08)
[ conference | journal | arxiv ]

Strong Equilibrium in Cost-Sharing Connection Games
Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman and Yishay Mansour
In Games and Economic Behavior, 67:51-68, 2009. Appeared before in Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'07). Best Student Paper Award.
[ conference | journal ]

Efficient Graph Topologies in Network Routing Games
Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman and Yishay Mansour
In Games and Economic Behavior, 66:115-125, 2009. Appeared before in Joint Workshop on Economics of Networked Systems and Incentive-Based Computing, 2007. To appear in Games and Economic Behavior.
[ journal ]

The Misperception of Norms: The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium
Robert Cooter, Michal Feldman and Yuval Feldman
In Review of Law and Economics, 4(3).
[ full ]

Strong Price of Anarchy
Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman and Yishay Mansour
In Games and Economic Behavior, 65(2):289-317, 2009. Appeared before in ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2007 (SODA'07).
[ conference | journal ]

Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman and Noam Nisan
In Journal of AI Research (JAIR) 38:339-369, 2010. Also presented in the Second International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics 2006 (WINE'06), and in the Second Bertinoro Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory 2006 (AGATE'06).
[ conference | journal | arxiv ]

Combinatorial Agency
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman and Noam Nisan
In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'06), 18-28.
[ conference ]

Implementation with a Bounded Action Space
Liad Blumrosen and Michal Feldman
In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'06).
[ conference ]

Free-Riding and Whitewashing in Peer-to-Peer Systems
Michal Feldman, Christos Papadimitriou, John Chuang and Ion Stoica
IEEE J-SAC spcial issue on Price-Based Access Control and Economics for Communication Networks, 24(5):1010-1019, 2006.An earlier version appeared in Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM 2004, Workshop of Practice and Theory of Incentives and Game Theory in Networked Systems (PINS'04), Portland, Oregon, September 2004. An earlier version also appeared in Proceedings (online) of the Third Annual Workshop on Economics of Information Security (WEIS'04), University of Minnesota, Minnesota, May 2004.
[ journal ]

2002 - 2005

Overcoming Free-Riding Behavior in Peer-to-Peer Systems
Michal Feldman and John Chuang
ACM Sigecom Exchanges Vol. 6.1, July 2005
[ journal ]

The Evolution of Cooperation under Cheap Pseudonyms
Michal Feldman and John Chuang
In Proceedings of the 7th International IEEE Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC'05), July 2005
[ conference ]

The Proportional-share Allocation Market for Computational Resources
Michal Feldman, Li Zhang and Kevin Lai
In IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 20(8):1075-1088. An earlier version, "A Price-Anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for Distributed Shared Clusters", appeared in Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2005 (EC'05).EC'05).
[ conference | journal ]

A Price-Anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for Distributed Shared Clusters
Michal Feldman, Li Zhang and Kevin Lai
In Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'05), Vancouver, June 2005
[ conference | arxiv ]

 

Hidden-Action in Multi-Hop Routing
Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica and Scott Shenker
In Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce(EC'05), Vancouver, June 2005. An earlier version appeared in Proceedings (online) of the Second Annual Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems. Harvard University, Cambridge, June 2004.
[ conference ]

Robust Incentive Techniques for Peer-to-Peer Networks
Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Ion Stoica and John Chuang
In Proceedings of the Fifth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'04), New-York, May 2004.
[ conference ]

Quantifying Disincentives in Peer-to-Peer Networks
Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, John Chuang and Ion Stoica
In proceedings (online) of the First Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, California, USA. June 2003.
[ conference ]

Incentives for Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Networks
Kevin Lai, Michal Feldman, Ion Stoica and John Chuang
In proceedings (online) of the First Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, California, USA. June 2003.
[ conference ]

IPTPS: Workshop Report
Michal Feldman and Shelley Zhang
Peer-to-Peer Systems II. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 2735. March 2003

 

Service Differentiation in Web Caching and Content Distribution Networks
Michal Feldman and John Chuang
In Proceedings of the IASTED International Conference on Communication and Computer Networks (CCN 2002), Cambridge, USA. November 2002
[ conference ]

Improving the Usability of Open Source Software: Usability Testing of StarOffice Calc
Susanne Eklund, Michal Feldman, Mary Trombley a
nd Rashmi Sinha
CHI Workshop on Open Source Usability April 2002

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